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SUMMARY
This article examines the changes towards more gender-sensitive interpretations 
of refugee status in international and national asylum laws and policies within the 
context of contemporary and historical global power relations. It also analyzes the 
changes in the language that can be found in the international UNHCR guidelines 
for the protection of women asylum seekers, U.S. national guidelines for assessing 
gender-related asylum claims, and recent U.S. court decisions assessing the gendered 
claims of women. Among the analyzed court cases, the focus is on the 2005 Moham-
med case due to its problematic court decision and legal interpretations. Finding the 
Western countries’ instrumentalization of the international refugee protection sys-
tem crucial for understanding the contemporary asylum system and women asylum 
seekers, the argument connects the historical conditions with the way in which the 
protection of women refugees from “cultural” gendered violence has been articu-
lated in asylum politics in the U.S. The author’s overall findings are that international 
law, governmental organizations, and liberal women’s human rights NGOs have 
shaped the international and national legal protection of (women) asylum seekers 
in such a way that it reproduces global inequalities in its representation of “Third 
World” women and their culture, uses women asylum seekers fleeing from violence 
for the purpose of exercising Western cultural superiority, and covers up the restric-
tive and racist Western asylum politics towards immigrants and asylum seekers.
KEY WORDS: gender-based asylum, protection of asylum seekers, orientalism, in-
ternational law, women’s human rights
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the Croatian government granted its first asylum, as it was 
stated on the Ministry of Internal Affairs website, to a woman from Sudan 
who was fleeing gender-based persecution, that is, female genital mutila-
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tion (FGM), among other things.1 She was the first asylum seeker whose 
application was accepted in contemporary Croatian history after more than 
400 asylum claims had been declined. This decision awoke the activists 
and researchers concerned with issues of asylum and the human rights of 
asylum-seekers from a years-long doze, in which several hundreds of ap-
plicants were previously refused. Although the first asylum-seeker applied 
for asylum in 1997, the law on asylum was not passed until 2003 (Župarić-
Iljić, 2013). This breakthrough was particularly puzzling since the grounds 
for granting the first asylum, i.e. gender-based persecution, were in 2006 
still debated on the international level. Croatia, as a country still unpre-
pared, both legally and practically, for recognizing various types of asy-
lum, had in fact put itself at forefront of gender-asylum recognition. Even 
more puzzling was the Ministry’s reference to different countries (Canada, 
Sweden, France, Great Britain and U.S.) and international regulations that 
give grounds for asylum to persons fleeing such persecution, while at the 
same time refusing more than 400 cases of asylum-seekers up to that point. 
Although many national policies in Europe and around the world still do 
not recognize it, this novel practice, primarily in the international legal sys-
tem but also adopted in some Western countries, initiated both jurist and 
feminist debates on the role of gender and sexuality in asylum systems. Fur-
thermore, it initiated debates among feminist scholars and activists on how 
this inclusion, in instances where it appeared, affected the already existing 
cultural discourses on the East (or South)/West divide in which women and 
the concepts of gender equality had taken a central place. This article will 
inquire into how gender-based asylum as a concept that entered interna-
tional regulations transformed into a national legal system, namely the U.S. 
court practice, and what consequences can be seen from such transforma-
tion, particularly in shaping different cultural discourses and creating the 
cultural identities of the asylum-seekers on the one hand and of the host 
countries on the other. Finally, this article will present an analysis of the 
appropriation of international regulations into a national legal and social 
system that perhaps can be used for analyzing similar adaptations in other 
countries in which the shaping and re-shaping of identitarian concepts such 
as gender, sexuality, culture, and ethnicity play a central role. 
1 The Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MUP) granted its first asylum on November 15th, 
2006, to a claimant on the grounds of religious persecution and female genital mutilation. 
MUP explained that this decision had been made due to the international and national 
legal practice, listing states like Canada, the U.S. and others, that recognized violations of 
women’s rights as grounds for accepting asylum claims (MUP, 2006). 
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GENDER ASYLUM AS A FEMINIST ISSUE
Women’s human rights conferences and conventions2 have contributed 
greatly to the recognition of gender-based persecution as a legitimate 
claim for international refugee protection under the UN’s definition of 
the refugee. Gender-sensitive asylum regulations entered international 
law, and consequently national asylum laws, in response to the advocacy 
of both the international women’s movement and local activists such as 
refugee advocates. In the mid-1990s, asylum was granted for the first time 
in the U.S., Canada, and Sweden to women fleeing from female genital 
mutilation. These states, responding to the UNHCR’s recommendations, 
also issued guidelines for dealing with gender-based asylum claims for 
its officers. The UN’s Guidelines on International Protection: Gender Related 
Persecution (UNHCR, 2002) today function as a recognized legislative 
recommendation for all UN member states. In 2005, in the case Mohammed 
v. Gonzales, the U.S. appeals court ruled in favour of granting asylum to 
Khadija Mohammed exclusively on the grounds of gendered persecution, 
that is FGM (female genital mutilation). More precisely, the asylum was not 
granted on the grounds that the claimant expressed opposition to practices 
of the dominant regime, but “on the fact that the victim is female in the 
culture that mutilates the genitalia of its females” (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 
2005).
Advocates in the U.S., who work for the legal improvement of the status 
of women refugees as well as scholars who deal with the recognition of 
women’s specific needs in the asylum systems, have welcomed this trend 
in the U.S. asylum policy. Feminist scholars that were repeatedly pointing 
out the gender bias in the international and national regulations argued 
that international conventions as well as national laws and policies on asy-
lum have frequently overlooked or ignored the gendered nature of asylum 
claims or do not fully comprehend and act upon gendered structures and 
relations of power (Chisholm, 2001; Lieberman, 2002; Randall, 2002; Arnett, 
2005; Freedman, 2007, 2010). Gender and age barriers in the recognition of 
asylum claims, as well as lack of recognition of persecutions taking place in 
the “private” sphere proved to be grave at the expense of women and girls 
2 Such as the Convention of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1�7�, Decla-
ration on Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1��3, the UN’s World Conference 
on Human Rights in Vienna that recognized gender-based violence as a specific form of 
violation in 1��3, the Beijing Platform for Action adopted by the Fourth World Conference 
on Women in 1995 and, finally, the ICTFY’s (International Criminal Court for Former Yu-
goslavia) recognition of war rape as torture and persecution in 2000.
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fleeing violence and persecutions that are untypical for male refugees. The 
opponents of the expansion of refugee protection law to include women’s 
and girls’ specific asylum claims argued that asylum was and should re-
main exclusively a political refuge for those seeking positive change in their 
countries of origin (Stein, 1��6). Such argumentation is rooted in the spirit of 
post-WWII refugee protection that, strengthened by Cold War rhetoric, saw 
asylum as a principle tool for instigating political transformation in Eastern 
Bloc countries. Nevertheless, the argument hits the nail on the head in as 
much as it underlines what much feminist scholarship claimed all along, 
namely that gender-based persecutions and consequently protection for it 
should be seen primarily as a political issue, inclusive of a variety of differ-
ent types of oppression. The debates about gender asylum quickly became 
an internal feminist issue. For instance, Grewal (1��8) argued that strategies 
of implementing gender-sensitive policies in asylum-seekers protection by 
many Western women’s groups failed to avoid falling into discursive na-
tionalism, such as the use of Third World women, represented as victims of 
religious and cultural backwards societies, for legitimizing the “superior-
ity” of Western-based feminist and human rights discourse. Visible most 
clearly in some of the first cases of granting asylum to women fleeing gen-
dered persecution, the discourse created in and around the courtrooms ech-
oed with culturalist and nationalist underpinnings, while failing to address 
the multiplicity of oppression that women experienced. 
Western academic feminism in the past has not hesitated to approach is-
sues of gender-based violence in different “cultures” and parts of the world 
without considering the potentially different “situatedness” of these cul-
tures within a system of global hierarchy/hegemony, even if this has re-
sulted in severe accusations from Third World women and men of about 
how these approaches support imperialism. Since the extensive critiques in 
the 1�80s and the 1��0s that engaged in dismantling the “universalism” of 
feminist claims that obscure global, cultural, and class inequalities, many 
authors have systematically pointed out the “skeleton” in the closet called: 
the feminist struggle to save Third World women (Spivak, 1�88; Mohanty, 
1�88). For Western feminists today, it is important not to slip into “‘coloni-
alism’ as a discursive practice” or into a “mode of appropriation and codi-
fication of ‘scholarship’ and ‘knowledge’ about women in the third world 
by particular analytic categories employed in writing on the subject which 
take as their primary point of reference feminist interests as they have been 
articulated in the U.S. and western Europe” (Mohanty, 1�88: 65). Gendered 
persecutions originating in “cultures” of the Third World as violations of 
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international and universal human rights as they are articulated in the in-
ternational and national systems of protection of asylum seeking women, 
therefore, have to be re-read taking into account feminism’s and the wom-
en’s movement’s own past. After all, gender asylum was a result of the in-
ternational women’s movements advocacy for more intense protection of 
fleeing women. Unfortunately, in many cases, the claim of women fleeing 
multiple oppressions have been misused for arguing the case of universal 
patriarchy or even worse the existence of a “Muslim”, “African” or other 
non-western patriarchy. Such “discursive colonization” of the material and 
historical heterogeneities of the lives of women in the Third World result-
ed in the production and reproductions of singular monolithic categories 
and images, and indirectly reinforced the discourse of building the western 
women’s agency at the cost of Third World women (Mohanty, 1�88: 66). 
In many court cases central to attaining asylum and, therefore, the claims 
of women, usually written by their advocates from activist organizations, 
was the use of the term “culture”. Culture was central when referring to the 
persecution of women in their native countries and when speaking about 
cultural differences between the host country and the country of origin. 
Taking into account that most of the feminist scholarship in migration stud-
ies points only to the universal female gender as excluded from interna-
tional refugee law, one possible approach for transforming transnational 
feminisms is to reconstruct the dominant value-system. As suggested by 
Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1��4), feminism should always take 
into account that power is scattered depending on different national, his-
torical, social, and other contexts. “If feminist political practices do not ac-
knowledge transnational cultural flows, feminist movements will fail to 
understand the material conditions that structure women’s lives in diverse 
locations” (Grewal and Kaplan, 1��4: 17), and it will further reproduce uni-
versalizing claims of dominant Western cultures. The reasons for the mate-
rial oppression of women is not only the “inhuman” patriarchal culture and 
religion of the Third World, but it also includes the international hegemonic 
oppression of women as a part of the Third World, or as part of global 
inequalities, local nationalisms, the local structures of domination, state-
juridical oppression, and their influence on each other. Precisely because of 
the multiple and changeable systems of power and domination, the term 
“culture” loses any stable referent and, thus, becomes obsolete to use in 
referring to the root of people’s social practices, let alone people’s oppres-
sion. For Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan (1��4: 17–18), “transnational 
feminist practices require this kind of comparative work rather than the 
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relativist linking of ‘differences’ undertaken by proponents of ‘global femi-
nism’; that is, to compare multiple, overlapping, and discrete oppressions 
rather than to construct a theory of hegemonic oppression under a unified 
category of gender”. Consequently, feminist international practice should 
be against any essentializing of non-western cultures and peoples, against 
the imaginary of the Other – the patriarchal savage – and against any use of 
women as markers of this Eurocentric representation of difference.
The historical and political context in which the internationalization of 
asylum and refugee protection took place reflects the political conditions 
in which contemporary definitions and interpretations have been shaped 
and, consequently, the difficulties of introducing both gendered and Third 
World cultural experiences of asylum claimants into the law and national 
court practices. Concentrating on “detecting silence” (of women’s and other 
oppressed groups’ voices), and “world traveling” (as a self-reflective re-
sponse to differences among women and a critique of the use of monolithic 
categories, such as “Western women” and the “Third World women”), Hi-
lary Charlesworth (2003) sets up a possible methodology that should un-
cover international law’s claims to generalizations and universalism and 
the ways that structural hierarchies and inequalities both between men 
and women, and between different groups of women are played out. More 
precisely, the protection of women from gender-based violence in interna-
tional and U.S. asylum law can be seen as male oriented, i.e. silencing the 
gender related claims − but also reflecting the unequal power relations be-
tween women themselves, i.e. between women refugees and their Ameri-
can advocates and attorneys. Anne Orford (2003) outlines the pitfalls and 
implications of unreflexive claims by feminist scholars and activists in the 
international arena. A different scholarly approach for feminists and other 
reformist international politics is needed – one that is strongly aware of the 
consequences of any claim in the context of international law and power 
relations. Feminist scholarship and politics should not enter without tak-
ing into account the colonial-rooted and Western-oriented structure and 
foundations of these institutions. Anthony Anghie (2002) similarly propos-
es that international law and organizations cannot be detached from the 
colonial past. The new “science of development” led by Western interests 
blossomed in organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN (“sci-
ence” that now includes human rights and women’s rights as crucial in 
their development goals), which were encouraged by the historical poten-
tial of internationalism, i.e. “the spirit” of the 20th century. Some of these 
international approaches, he argues, have been seriously disadvantageous 
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for Third World countries (starting from the League’s mandate to interna-
tionalize colonialism) (Anghie, 2002). Therefore, feminist scholarship and 
politics in the sphere of international law have to be open-ended, com-
municative, and communicated among different parties in this system of 
multiple global inequalities. If we see international law and organizations 
as such, it would be easier to avoid the implications of unreflexive claims, 
such as the appropriation of a feminist reformist agenda by the neocolonial 
and nationalistic projects (which are frequent in the contemporary era of 
“humanitarian” interventions that legitimize themselves with reference to 
women’s rights, among other things, while still reproducing unequal inter-
national power relations).3
GENDER-ASYLUM IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Many of the issues concerning complex and multifold power relations 
inscribed in the asylum-seekers protection system stem from the historical 
development of certain concepts and definitions, such as the definition of 
the refugee, of what constitutes persecution and on which grounds. Addi-
tionally, asylum as a concept is intrinsically an international issue that was 
legally and politically “born” from complex and often conflicted relations 
between states as well as between the international and national level of de-
cision making. The first internationalization of the refugee system appeared 
in the period of the demise of Western European colonialism and of the 
beginning of Western anti-communist politics, with the Leagues of Nations’ 
(LN) regulations of refugee status in the period between 1�20 and 1�35.4 
Until then, only states were seen as significant agents in the international 
arena, while the concept of a refugee was seen as an international anomaly, 
i.e. stateless persons in a world of nation-states.5 The refugee explosion in 
the interwar period made refugees become visible actors in international re-
lations and law as the flow and resettlement of people could not be coordi-
nated by any single state alone. In the 1�20s, the Russian Revolution refugee 
3 This refers to a feminist critique on contemporary American nationalist endeavours to 
appropriate feminist claims for humanitarian and neocolonial interventions in the world 
(see, for example, Abu-Lughod, 2002).
4 The 1�51 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees mentions the following agree-
ments and conventions inherited from the League of Nations: the Arrangements of 12 May 
1�26 and 30 June 1�28, the Conventions of 28 October 1�33 and 10 February 1�38, the Pro-
tocol of 14 September 1�3�, and the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization 
(UNHCR, 2010: 14).
5 The existing international law did not recognize individuals as holders of rights in the 
international arena (see Hathaway, 2000: 10). 
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flows made Western countries realize how highly political and sensitive the 
refugee issue was becoming in international relations. As a consequence, in 
1�21 the High Commissioner for Refugees for dealing with Russian refu-
gees was established by the League of Nations, which was later replaced 
by the Nansen International Office for Refugees in 1930 as an autonomous 
and non-political organization recognized by the LN (Jaeger, 2001: 728). It 
can be said that the asylum and refugee system grew out of the East/West 
divide, which grew stronger and stronger with the Cold War. Furthermore, 
the financial insecurity and the decline of League’s reputation contributed 
to the demise of the power of the League’s international protection of ref-
ugees (Jaeger, 2001: 727–732) and additionally weakened its international 
and neutral position. The Nansen Office experienced yet another crisis with 
the refugee avalanche from Germany, Italy, and Spain, consisting of mostly 
Jewish and other politically persecuted refugees. The Refugee Convention 
that was organized in October 1�33 and was adopted by 14 states did not 
pass without difficulties, but today it presents the first international ref-
ugee law document. The difficulties related to the implementation of the 
protection for Europe’s own citizens, Jews.6 Finally, the horrors of WWII 
influenced the transformation of the international protection of refugees, 
with the newly formed UNHCR as a structural and ideological heir of the 
Nansen Office. 
The extent to which we can see the UNHCR endeavours to assist refu-
gees and displaced people in truly internationally coordinated and sup-
ported projects as successful depends on the larger political context of the 
time, on the consequences and implications of the legal framework it has 
established, as well as on its impact on the member states. When the UN 
initiated the UNHCR in 1�50/51, its independence and non-political nature 
were emphasized in the context of the beginning of tensions between the 
two blocks in the Cold War. Refugees became a highly risky and political 
issue.7 In this context of political fights, a “nonpolitical” intervention by the 
neutral body was needed both for the states and for the UN. What seems 
to be different from recent trends in refugee protection is the fact that refu-
gees in the founding period of the UNHCR came mostly from communist 
countries, admitted for permanent resettlement, and were also generously 
6 Robert Beck (1���) describes how Britain was reluctant to ratify the convention seen as 
intervening in national sovereignty. The refugee question was a part of the debate about 
British reluctance to accept a large number of Jewish refugees from the National Socialist 
regime in Germany.
7 Guy Goodwin-Gill (2001) and Charles Keely (2001) write about the beginning of the Cold 
War and its influence on the early UN refugee system.
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admitted in large numbers by Western European and Northern American 
governments. For example, during Castro’s rise to power in Cuba, the U.S. 
publicly supported asylum seeking migrations. In this case, the aim of U.S. 
Cold War politics was not to introduce stability but to destabilize the com-
munist regimes and influence their collapse by supporting the internal 
groups and the emigrants that were opposing them (Keely, 2001: 306–308). 
This argument goes even further to claim that asylum politics has long been 
a tool for the U.S. foreign policy towards communist countries (Gibney, 
2004: 132). The UNHCR had to take into consideration these political events 
and its implications for the international protection of refugees, i.e. the in-
strumentalization of asylum for international power struggles, for which 
it emphasized its neutrality and the nonpolitical nature of its work in its 
Statute.8 Such proclamations reflect the UNHCR’s intention to be truly in-
ternational, non-biased, and reformist in protecting the universal right of the 
individual to asylum.� 
Although this presented a step forward for the international protec-
tion of refugees towards more decentralized power relations, the Cold War 
power relations were inscribed in the work and policies of the UNHCR. 
In the formative period of the UNHCR, the U.S. and Western European 
countries saw refugee regulation as part of the ongoing Cold War politics 
and a matter of home security. By pushing the interest of their own coun-
tries and dealing with refugees independently of the UNHCR, Western 
countries consequently minimized the authority of the power appointed 
to the Commissioner. Additionally, the financial structure of the UNHCR 
depended mostly on rich countries, and these donors did push their po-
litical interests.10 Consequently, the UNHCR’s regulation offered an outline 
for the protection of refugees which was dependent on a principle of state 
sovereignty and the primary states’ role in the protection of refugees, which 
consequently allowed for ambiguous and unclear or minimalistic respon-
sibilities for the host states. Finally, even though the Statute declared the 
8 The Statute of the UNHCR states in its second article: “The work of High Commissioner 
shall be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social, and shall 
relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees” (UNHCR, 1��6: 8).
9 The UNHCR was given a mandate by the General Assembly in order for the office to be 
neutral, legitimate, and democratically governed (UNHCR, 1��6: 8–�).
10 For example, in the beginning of the UNHCR’s work at the beginning of the Cold War, 
refugees were handled by the U.S. in an alternative way. The UNHCR had severe finan-
cial problems and the Ford Foundation’s donations played a crucial role in “saving” the 
institution. These donations have to be seen in the context of highly political events dur-
ing the period, such as Hungarian refugees from 1�56 within the Soviet/American power 
competition (Gallagher, 1�8�: 582).
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UNHCR as neutral and universal, the agency dealt primarily with Euro-
pean refugees, with its first non-European office opening as late as 1962 in 
Burundi.11 
The consequences of the Cold War on the refugee system, therefore, af-
fected mostly Third World refugees; but by the end of the Cold War, in 
the 1�70s and 1�80s, restrictive asylum policies were introduced indiscrimi-
nately. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, asylum was no longer offered so 
generously to ex-communist nationals. Charles Keely (2001: 306) argues 
that the contemporary crisis of the asylum system derives precisely from 
the formative period of the UNHCR and manipulation and instrumentali-
zation of the asylum system by the U.S. and other Western countries push-
ing their interests to destabilize the communist bloc. He further argues that 
since the LN, but definitely since the 1951 UN Convention on the status 
of refugees, there have been two policies in the international arena: one 
for the refugees of the Soviet bloc, and another for the rest of the world 
(meaning Third World countries). As a result, the UNHCR’s agenda was 
primarily focused on Third World refugees while leaving the asylum poli-
cies in the West to the arbitrary power of the states. For Anthony Richmond 
(1��4), the previous generous asylum protection granted to the communist 
bloc refugees, but guaranteed to all universally through the 1�67 Protocol, 
now seems clearer than ever as a “cold luxury”, and one that was mainly 
reserved for Europeans, making the contemporary Western policies of asy-
lum a form of global apartheid.
These historical events and conditions had their impact on the legal for-
mulations of the status of refugees, especially in as much as they shaped to 
some extent gendered and racialized definitions of a refugee. The definition 
in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1951 defines the 
experience of European (male) refugees in the period of the Second World 
War.12 The Convention even stated so in its Chapter 1 (“As a result of events 
occurring before 1 January 1951 …”) (UNHCR, 2010: 14). The definition 
11 Difficulties in reaching full international membership and representation can be seen in 
the fact that, for example, the UNHCR’s controlling body (Executive Committee) was com-
posed of only 24 member states’ appointees and reached membership of 70 different coun-
tries as late as 2006. Secondly, the list of High Commissioners shows that most (all except 
one) of the commissioners came from Western countries. And thirdly, the UNHCR office 
was not opened outside Europe until 1�62 in Burundi (UNHCR, 1��6, 2011).
12 A refugee is a person who due “to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 2010: 14).
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recognized primarily political dissidents and then national, “racial”, and 
religious minorities as eligible for asylum. The concept of “membership in 
a social group”, where varieties of otherwise ignored reasons for claiming 
asylum could be placed, was not elaborated in detail but practically takes 
into account adult, male, and European experiences of refugees. Finally, by 
placing persecution in the sphere of the public and political and, therefore, 
privileging primarily male-types of political persecutions, the Convention 
limits the recognition of many different kinds of persecution experienced 
by women.
Although the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1�67 re-
moved to some extent geographical limitations to the Eurocentric refugee 
law, the definition regulating what could be considered as persecution, and 
therefore, a legitimate claim for refugee status, did not change.13 Despite 
the fact that geographical limitations were nominally removed, the defini-
tion of the refugee and the scope of recognized persecutions were not ex-
panded in such a way that they would include refugee experiences around 
the globe. James Hathaway (2000) argues, it is the Euro-centered definitions 
in the refugee law that prevent full recognition of the needs of Third World 
asylum seekers, as most of the Third World refugees flee for reasons such 
as war, ethnic conflicts, and persecution, natural disasters, and others, and 
as such are excluded from the right to asylum. He argues that it is difficult 
to claim that this (Eurocentric definition) was done on purpose, in order to 
exclude the underdeveloped countries’ refugees, but it was more likely an 
effect of the UNHCR’s “universalistic” ambitions and, accordingly, its uni-
versalistic definition for refugees that took precedent in the Protocol 1967 
(Hathaway, 2000: 61).
As the definition of the refugee was in many ways a result of the his-
torical conditions stated above, gender, sexuality, and many other possible 
grounds for persecution specific to women were not included neither in the 
1�51 Convention, nor in the later documents. The groundbreaking point 
was the 1�85 Acosta case, when the U.S. court recognized that sex/gender 
can be accepted as grounds for persecution within the criteria of “member-
13 The Convention states: “Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the 
Convention was adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the 
scope of the Convention”, and “[c]onsidering that it is desirable that equal status should 
be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the 
dateline 1st January 1�51, (…) the term ‘refugee’ shall (…) mean any person within the defi-
nition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words ‘As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1�51 and...’ and the words ‘...as a result of such events’, in article 1 A (2) were 
omitted. […] The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any 
geographic limitation […]” (UNHCR, 2010: 46, the author’s emphasis ).
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ship in a particular social group”. The U.S. appeals court elaborated what 
the definition of the persecution on account of membership in a particular 
social group could mean in order to include gender/sex:
[…] persecution on account of membership in a particular social group encom-
passes persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a 
group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic […] 
such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared 
past experience such as military leadership or land ownership. (Matter of Acos-
ta, 1�85)
Until such interpretation did not exist at the national court level, the 
Convention was deemed to proscribe membership in a particular social 
group only as class and political group membership, or as the refugee’s 
“past experience such as former military leadership or ownership”. Such 
definition of “a social group” clearly pinpointed refugees fleeing commu-
nist persecution of bourgeoisie and landowners or fleeing anti-colonial up-
risings against western and local elites. Many feminist scholars and activists 
have persistently pointed out the gender bias in the legal definition, arguing 
that “gender” could form a sixth category for grounds of claiming asylum 
(e.g. Kim, 1��3; Schenk, 1��4). The male-centered standard in the refugee 
law excluded a whole range of individual approaches to the protection of 
refugees that experienced different kinds of persecutions characterized by 
age, gender, sexuality, cultural, religious, political, physical, mental, and 
other factors. Consequently, the gender and age inclusive reforms were 
pushed forward most visibly in the last few decades by women’s move-
ments. Women’s movements and women’s rights conventions influenced 
slowly but successfully the international human rights law by pointing to 
the different, gender-specific kinds of torture, persecution, and violence, 
which makes women’s asylum claims sometimes different from their fam-
ily members.14 Finally, the UNHCR’s Executive Committee issued a conclu-
sion in 1�85 that encourages states to take into consideration: “(W)omen 
asylum seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having 
transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be con-
sidered as a ‘particular social group’” (UNHCR, 200�: 50). The UNHCR re-
peatedly called on states to recognize the gender specific persecution that 
women refugees experience and recommended the special treatment of 
women, special training for officers, and development of national guide-
lines for these matters.15 In 1995, the first national guidelines for the specific 
14 See footnote 2. 
15 In 1990, ExCom recommended that states should provide women asylum officers. In 1991, 
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needs of women asylum seekers were issued in the U.S., and followed by 
Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands.16 The case law in these states has 
contributed to the recognition of a wide range of persecutory acts that are 
gender-related, such as sexual violence, domestic violence, punishments, 
and discrimination for the transgression of social mores, sexual orienta-
tion (rarely), FGM (female genital mutilation), and trafficking. International 
recommendations and guidelines opened up a space for the protection of 
women who suffer multiple and complex kinds of persecution, which ear-
lier could not have been incorporated in the male-centered definitions. 
Although the UNHCR’s policies can be seen as a step forward towards 
acknowledgment of gender differences in refugee protection, the applica-
tion of these policies at a national level seemed to be more complex. As a 
consequence, keeping the limited definitions in recognition of Third World 
refugee claims as a product of historical events and global political dichot-
omies in which international and U.S. refugee protection was developed, 
women’s claims for asylum in the hands of women’s groups advocates 
seemed to emphasize only gender, while excluding their political opinions, 
their religious interpretations, material oppression, and in that sense failing 
to see gender as a part of broader context.
GENDER-BASED ASYLUM CLAIMS: FROM INTERNATIONAL 
TO NATIONAL PROTECTION 
The U.S. court decisions over the past decade, as well as the advocacy 
around particular cases usually involving women’s rights NGOs, have been 
crucial for the recognition of the claims of women asylum seekers as well 
as the development of the asylum law towards acknowledging “cultural” 
violence against women in non-Western countries as a basis for granting 
the UNHCR issued Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women in which it was rec-
ommended that the special needs of women in refugee camps should be recognized. In 
1��3, ExCom encouraged the development of national guidelines. In 1��5, 1��6, 1��7, and 
1���, ExCom again called for the recognition of women’s refugee status within the criteria 
of “a social group” (within the 1951 Convention definition of refugee) and consideration 
for different gender-related persecutions that they experience (ExCom Conclusion No. 64 
(XLI) – 1990;  http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68c441f.html).
16 The United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (1��5); the Department 
of Immigration and Humanitarian Affairs of Australia, Refugee and Humanitarian Visa Ap-
plicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for Decision Makers, July, 1��6; the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada, Guideline 4 on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related 
Persecution: Update, 13 Nov. 1��6; and the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice, Working Instruction No. 148: Women in Asylum Procedures, subsequently superseded by 
guidelines in the Aliens Circular 2000.
20_Matesic.indd   19 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
Migracijske i etničke teme 30 (2014), 1: 7–32
20
asylum. The advocates, along with the judges, had to answer some cru-
cial questions: Are women persecuted by their culture, state, or local social 
groups? To what kind of a “culture” do these cases refer − geographically 
and discursively? Are all women members of the potentially persecuted 
group or only the women opposing the dominant treatment imposed upon 
them? Are these gendered persecutions contextualized with regard to class, 
place of living, age, ethnicity, and individual political, religious, and oth-
er beliefs? In many of these questions, culture and women’s position in it 
seemed to be central. Some scholars have pointed out that asylum law con-
tains culturalist prejudices that can instrumentalize and even alter the asy-
lum claims, especially in case law (Akram, 2000; Sinha, 2001). Susan Akram 
(2000) argues this is particularly so if we look into the approach of refugee 
advocates towards claims of women refugees from Muslim cultures. Mus-
lim refugee persecution stories are often altered to fit the misconceptions of 
Islam as monolithic, oppressive towards women, and cruel and inhumane 
in all of its practices. Namely, the asylum claims, rearticulated by judges 
or refugee advocates in the U.S. and Canadian courts, especially those of 
Muslim women claimants, have continuously referred to Islamic laws or 
cultures as the oppressor, instead of, for example, state laws that fail to pro-
tect citizens from persecution, or family practices (Akram, 2000: 20).17 These 
claims, she argues, formulated by the refugee advocates, silence the real op-
pression that women undergo by naming the oppressor simply as “Muslim 
customs” or religion. In the case of Nada in 1��1 in Canada, a Saudi woman 
claiming to be persecuted for refusing to wear a veil, the advocates claimed 
that she was a member of “a particular social group”, a group that accord-
ing to UNHCR’s gender sensitive recommendations included all Saudi 
women opposing “Muslim customs” (Akram, 2000: 18). From there, Nada 
was represented by the advocates as somebody denouncing her religion, al-
though that was not the case, since she made a statement herself explaining 
that she was fleeing from the political oppression of women which, for her, 
had no religious or cultural roots (Akram, 2000: 26). Although her applica-
tion could have been formulated as a persecution due to difference in views 
on state-supported religious law, the choice of her attorneys to formulate 
her claim in such a way resulted in the representation of her as a group of 
Saudi women denouncing Islam and Saudi culture. Encouraging the claims 
for asylum solely on gendered persecution as self-evidently caused by the 
17 The author explains the case of Bostanipour, where the court referred to the applicant’s 
persecution as performed by the Islamic law that forbids the change of religious belief, and 
not the Iranian state law which actually failed to protect the religious minority. 
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Islamic, Islamist, or “Muslim culture”, refugee advocates persist on pre-
senting women as denouncing and opposing their culture and religion. 
The U.S. courts ruled in favour of an asylum claim based on gender 
as reason of persecution for the first time in 1996, in the case of Kassindja. 
Kassindja’s case for asylum was based on her opposing to FGM as a form 
of violence and therefore persecution that took place in her home country 
of Togo. The U.S. asylum officers and appealing courts based their rulings 
on the UN 1951/1967 definition of a refugee, the UNHCR guidelines and 
recommendations, and, finally, on the 1995 U.S. Considerations for Asylum 
Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women. The recognition of gender 
as a category in the U.S. courts was also influenced by the advocates lob-
bying within different spheres of refugee law. The Kassindja case was based 
on a previous court’s recognition of persecution conducted in the private 
sphere in the Fatin v. INS case in 1��� which allowed for the change in the, 
until then, exclusive public definition of persecution enforced by the state 
or non-state individuals and groups in the public sphere. In the Fatin v. INS 
case, the U.S. appeals court ruled that Fatin could be considered a member 
of the “social group of the upper class Iranian women who supported the 
Shah of Iran, a group of educated westernized free-thinking individuals” (Fatin 
v. INS, 1���, the author’s emphasis). It was clear from this ruling that not 
all women in Iran are eligible for asylum, but nevertheless that gender/sex 
makes a social group whose members are targeted for persecution. Fatin 
based her claim on a combination of criteria: political and gender perse-
cution. She was a member of a subgroup − women who oppose dominant 
restrictive gender regulations. The court refused her claim because she did 
not prove that her political (gendered) beliefs were strong enough to be at 
risk of persecution, although the court was very sympathetic to women in 
Iran due to Iran’s harsh and inhumane treatment of females (“the Court 
is very much sympathetic to the respondent’s desire not to return to Iran, 
[because] she would be subject to the same discriminatory treatment as all 
other women in Iran […]” (Fatin v. INS, 1���)). The court refused her po-
litical asylum, but declared women could form a social group and with it 
established a precedent, i.e. expanded the definition of persecution in a way 
that gender-based violence was included as a persecutory act. The Kassindja 
case was the first case in which asylum was granted to a person fleeing 
from gender-based violence, namely opposing FGM, which presented a 
well-founded fear of persecution on the grounds of membership in a social 
group. With the Kassindja case, sex/gender was accepted for the first time 
as legitimate grounds for granting the host-country’s protection. Kassindja 
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was found to be a member of the social group of “Togolese young women 
opposing the practice” (Matter of Kassindja, 1��6).
At the same time, a variety of other claims of women have been re-
fused.18 Fatin’s case, for instance, was an example of the court’s failure to 
recognize women’s specific, complex political claims within the asylum 
law. Women asylum seekers often claimed various and multiple oppres-
sions involving religion (different religious interpretations of gender roles), 
political opinions (different political opinions on gender roles), and mem-
bership in a family (opposing the family gender roles). While during the 
Cold War, political opposition to communist ideology was considered le-
gitimate grounds for attaining asylum in the U.S., already in the 1990s and 
2000s women’s persecution based on different political beliefs (opposing 
certain patriarchal practices often supported by their states) was not seen as 
credible. Finally, the successful implementation of international women’s 
rights policies in some countries finally enabled the gendered aspects of 
persecution to be recognized, but was this done at the expense of leveling 
down the complexity of different kinds of gendered and political persecu-
tions that women asylum seekers undergo, binding them to re-formulate 
their claims in a specific way?
ARE ALL WOMEN VICTIMS OF THEIR CULTURE?
Successful implementation of international and national gender-sen-
sitive guidelines such as the UNHCR guidelines, U.S. guidelines, and a 
number of cases that established legal tradition put into focus concepts such 
as “culture” and opened up the question whether culture can be a factor of 
persecution of (all) women. In that respect, the Mohammed v. Gonzales case 
in 2005, in which an asylum seeker was a young woman claiming protection 
for returning to Somalia where she would be persecuted based on her gen-
der, is extremely interesting for several reasons: it is the first case in which 
asylum was granted to a woman on the grounds of culturally-based perse-
cutory practices, namely FGM, although the genital modification/mutila-
tion had already been performed; secondly, in this case, the court ruled that 
Mohammed may be considered a member of a particular social group, “a 
group of all women in Somalia”; and thirdly, the court did not address Mo-
hammed as an individual opposing the persecution. Past persecution was 
found as an eligible claim for asylum as long as the claimant could prove 
that “an incident […] rise(s) to the level of persecution; that an incident was 
18  For example, Gichema v. Gonzalesor S-A case (Knief, 2006: 5−6).
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on account of one of the statutory-protected grounds; and was committed 
by the government or the forces that government is either unable or un-
willing to control” (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). In the decision, the judge 
expressed a strong conviction that “the range of procedures collectively 
known as female genital mutilation rises to the level of persecution within 
the meaning of our asylum law” (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). The decision 
further notes that the mutilation of women and girls is “a horrifically brutal 
procedure” often performed without anesthesia that results in long-term 
physical and psychological consequences (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). 
Since persecution can be physiological and emotional as well as physical, it 
constitutes a basis for asylum protection even if the persecution act already 
happened. Additionally, the court referred to a number of country reports 
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (RIC reports) and WHO, 
stating that this practice causes long-term harm, concluding that further or 
future mutilations are likely to happen (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). The 
court decision further states that FGM is “not an isolated act of violence, but 
rather a form of gender-based persecution, practiced to overcome sexual 
characteristics of young women, […] and to control women’s sexuality” 
(Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005).
[FGM] permanently disfigures a woman, causes long term health problems, 
and deprives her of a normal and fulfilling sexual life. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 
2005)
[…] government would have some difficulties in establishing that Mohamed 
would not be subjected to further violence that is related to her past persecution, 
given the conditions in Somalia. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005)
The court found that the claimant might be further tortured, e.g. she 
could be raped, further mutilated, etc. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). The 
informative reports provided by the RIC and cited in the decision made 
clear that the subordination and persecution of women in Somalia are not 
limited to FGM: 
Women are subordinated systematically in the country’s overwhelming patriar-
chal culture, and rape is commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts.19
In the Mohammed case, the court clearly recognized the long-term harm 
of persecutory acts against women and further concluded that the perse-
cution is embodied in the culture. Somalia’s “overwhelming patriarchal 
culture” was taken as the grounds for the court to conclude that Somali 
women suffer horrific oppression and persecution. Conditions in Somalia, 
19  The State Department’s Country Reports cited in the court’s ruling. 
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a country torn apart by long-lasting local and internationally influenced 
conflicts, are far from providing individuals or groups with a persecution-
free environment, but the particularities of these conditions were not ad-
dressed in the text. On the contrary, only the country’s “patriarchal culture” 
was strongly emphasized. Furthermore, Mohammed testified on a series of 
persecutory acts towards her family and herself. She was denied asylum on 
those grounds as she was not found credible earlier in the process (Moham-
med v. Gonzales, 2005). Ignoring other forms of persecution about which Mo-
hammed testified, the Ninth Circuit’s judge opened the court’s ruling with 
an extensive description of FGM that was taken from previous court rul-
ings such as the Kassindja case. Strong conviction of FGM and its “barbaric 
nature” was needed so that the judges could explain why Mohammed’s 
application for asylum was now accepted, although FGM was presented as 
evidence later in the trial: 
We note that many courts and the BIA [Board of Immigration Appeals] refer to 
the practice at issue here as FGM. We see no need for using the initials rather 
than the full three word phrase. We are short neither of paper nor of ink. The use 
of initials, if it has any effect, serves only to dull the senses and minimize the 
barbaric nature of the practice. The further bureaucratization of the language 
would serve no useful purpose here. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005)
Unlike to the UNHCR and U.S. state guidelines that address the cultures 
of asylum seekers very scarcely and bureaucratically, the text of the court 
decision repeatedly refers to monolithic cultural categories addressing with 
an authoritarian “we” the American public on what is considered to be le-
gally acceptable cultural practice. Further on, in contrast with the Kassindja 
case in which the applicant was found to be a member of the social group 
of women opposing certain social or cultural practice, the court found Mo-
hammed to be a member of a social group of all the (young) women in 
Somalia:
In this case, there are at least two ways in which the agency could define the 
social group to which Mohammed belongs. First, it could determine that she was 
persecuted because of her membership in the social group of young girls in the 
Benadiri clan. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005)
Although referring to the Kassindja case, the court found it was not nec-
essary that Mohammed be a member in a group that opposed FGM as:
[t]he persecution in this case – the forcible, painful cutting of a female’s body 
parts – is not a result of a woman’s opposition to the practice but rather a result 
of her sex and her clan membership and/or nationality. That is, the shared char-
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acteristic that motivates the persecution is not opposition, but that the victims 
are female in a culture that mutilates the genitalia of its females. (Mohammed 
v. Gonzales, 2005)
Finally, unlike in the Fatin case in which the court ruled opposition is 
necessary to establish a social group, the court concluded that the asylum 
could be granted based on membership in a group of all Somali females, 
since �8% of them have been genitally “mutilated”, establishing precedence 
in the gender-based asylum case law: 
Although we have not previously expressly recognized females as a social group, 
the recognition that girls or women of a particular clan or nationality (or even 
in some circumstances females in general) may constitute a social group is sim-
ply a logical application of our law. (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005)
Such monolithic definition of a homogeneous social group formed on 
a “biological” and “inherent” trait without any political stand or agency, 
against which persecution is conducted systematically, defers significantly 
from the discourse of the international and U.S. guidelines. The U.S. guide-
lines themselves recommend that women could be found constituting a so-
cial group, as they can experience gender-specific types of persecution or 
their experiences are often shadowed by male members of the family, but 
their persecution has never been perceived as persecution based on gender/
sex solely. In that sense, the guidelines address issues of recognition of gen-
der specific claims within a variety of types of persecutions, consequently 
appropriate types of treatment in dealing with victims. 
Finally, another particularity that can be traced in this case was the ad-
dressing of the persecutor. The court in the Mohammed case stated that the 
persecution was proved to be enforced by the “culture” itself, as the gov-
ernment does not allow nor engages in practicing FGM, and there is no 
identifiable militia or group of people that are the persecutors. Moreover, 
in the case of FGM, the same women who are found to be victims of this 
cultural persecution, i.e. members of the particular social group constituted 
by all women in Somalia, appear to be the agents of the “persecution” (as 
FGM is conducted usually by a mother or female member of the family). In 
such a way, the court disregarded numerous other factors influencing the 
persecution, among which is the important role of the state and the fact that 
the state in this instance could be found responsible for allowing for such 
persecution of young girls or failing to protect its citizens.
20_Matesic.indd   25 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
Migracijske i etničke teme 30 (2014), 1: 7–32
26
THE ROLE OF THE WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS AND 
ADVOCATES
In many of the groundbreaking cases, the advocates and the media play 
a crucial role. For instance, the court reopened Mohammed’s request after 
ruling that her previous attorney had failed to present evidence that she 
suffered from FGM in the past (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). When she 
applied for asylum, Mohammed claimed that she had a well-founded fear 
of persecution on account of her membership in a Benadiri clan. In the civil 
war, Mohammed said, her family fled Somalia when her brother and father 
disappeared, when her sister was raped, and when the militia attempted to 
arrest the rest of her family and clan (Mohammed v. Gonzales, 2005). Upon 
arrival to the U.S. via Ethiopia, she filled a request for asylum that was de-
nied on the grounds of a lack of credibility. After the denial, she hired a new 
attorney that pleaded for reconsidering the deportation because the claim-
ant feared genital mutilation upon her return. This was the first time FGM 
was mentioned, and it was obviously done on the advice of the new attor-
ney. The new claim stated that �8% of Somali women are “mutilated”, that 
Mohammed had not yet been genitally mutilated, and that Mohammed’s 
previous attorney failed to raise this evidence due to negligence. Although 
Mohammed’s physician report stated differently, i.e. that Mohammed had 
been genitally operated on, and although the state attorney argued that the 
new motion did not prove negligence due to the fact that FGM had not 
been proved in court practice as a sort of future threat (but only torture in 
the past), the court ruled in favour of reopening the application, because, as 
mentioned, FGM obviously presented a past persecution with long lasting 
consequences. Mohammed stated in her application:
I then hired a new attorney […] where I learned that my subjection to female 
genital mutilation constituted past persecution and torture. (Mohammed v. 
Gonzales, 2005)
In the second motion, Mohammed stated that she had been mutilated in 
her childhood and submitted the evidence for the previous attorney’s neg-
ligence, together with the medical report and WHO’s reports on women’s 
life conditions in Somalia. Her request was denied again by the asylum of-
ficers because of the failure to prove negligence. Finally, the Ninth Circuit 
judges, at the high court of appeals for asylum claims, accepted her request 
and eventually her claim. The advocates in this case used both the interna-
tional and the national legal framework, i. e. UNHCR and U.S. guidelines, 
in order to find a way for their claimants to gain asylum status, but in doing 
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so they did not contribute to the overall expansion of the legal recognition 
for the complex context of women’s persecution.
The media coverage of cases like Kassindja and Mohammed v. Gonzales 
additionally contributed to this goal. The National Public Radio broad-
casted a report (Lewis, 2005) on the Mohammed case under the title: “All 
women in Somalia could be found eligible for asylum in the U.S.”. After 
the Kassindja case was celebrated as the milestone of Third World women’s 
asylum claims, together with the advocate Karen Mussalo and the Center 
for Women and Refugees Studies, the Mohammed v. Gonzales case was seen 
as a sort of a victory in the struggle of women’s and asylum seekers’ rights 
NGOs. Local women’s human rights activists and legal experts, especially 
those working with immigrant women and against FGM, contributed to 
the media campaign, a campaign that was not solely oriented towards the 
courtrooms, but also towards American immigrant groups. Many local ac-
tivists fighting against FGM such as Catharine Hogan from the “Washing-
ton Metropolitan Alliance against Ritual FGM” commented on the asylum 
cases, stating that they should:
[…] warn [immigrants] families that we consider this child abuse […]. It is a 
form of reverse racism not to protect these girls from barbarous practice that 
rob them of a lifetime of their God-given right to an intact body (Gruenbaum, 
2001: 218).
The discourse in which the authoritarian “we” should warn the new im-
migrants what “the American culture” considers to be “barbarous” or what 
is a “God given right” seems to be unfortunately similar to the language 
of the court decision in the Mohammed v. Gonzales case. Finally, as Grew-
al (1��8: 513) points out, quoting the Canadian advocate and activist for 
women refugees Sherene Razack, women’s movement groups clearly em-
braced a successful strategy of rearticulating asylum claims so that women 
are “able to present themselves as victims of dysfunctional, unusually pa-
triarchal cultures and states”.
This “humanist” and “philanthropist” approach, linguistically voiced in 
authoritarian “we”, opens up several difficulties for the protection of wom-
en in asylum law and for the integrity of some women’s rights groups that 
seem to be juggling with local nationalism. Such approach does not critically 
address the restrictive, classist, male-centered, and culturalist U.S. asylum 
law in which women who are accepted on basis of their “unusually patri-
archal” cultures are waved as a flag of American freedom ideology. Grewal 
(1��8: 517) sees such asylum policy best represented by the imposed meta-
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phor of transition from “unfreedom to freedom”, in which the American 
nation is imagined as the “peak” of human rights development. Secondly, 
it does not address the complex and disadvantageous position that women 
asylum seekers are actually living, and the Mohammed v. Gonzales case is the 
best example. Mohammed testified in court on a whole range of disastrous 
and torturous events that she and her family had gone through, but until 
her advocates revealed her case as the circumcised Hottentot Venus exhib-
ited to the audience, she was not found “credible”. Her case, although in the 
end fortunately successful for her, unmasks the conservative U.S. asylum 
law and implies that there was no real interest to address complex material 
(as well as discursive) oppression of women in the Third World. 
CONCLUSION
In dealing with recent developments in refugee law towards gender-in-
clusive asylum-seekers’ protection, the author found that the international 
and global struggle for gender equality and women’s rights had a great 
influence of the national legal systems, as shown in U.S. case-law. In the 
court cases that the author analyzed, it was found that the implementation 
of the international standards for the protection of women asylum seek-
ers was often embedded in different national and hegemonic discourses in 
which women seeking asylum were presented as symbolic markers of hu-
man rights violations in Third World countries. The protection of (women) 
asylum seekers in these cases was framed primarily by courts but also by 
the legal and activist representatives of asylum seekers in such a way that 
reproduced global inequalities by representing the “Third World” women 
as victims of their culture, instrumentalizing women’s claims for broader 
political purposes while covering up in many ways the still restrictive and 
Eurocentric asylum politics towards asylum seekers. By pushing the gender 
asylum claims to the forefront in the analyzed cases, women’s advocates 
and activists silenced the actual and often complex political claims women 
were making, often aimed at the weak and dysfunctional states unable or 
unwilling to protect its (female) citizens, reformulating multifold oppres-
sions and persecutions to fit legally successful and publically intriguing 
metrics of gender-asylum claims in which the non-Western and “barbaric” 
cultures were marked as sole oppressors of (all) of its victimized women.
20_Matesic.indd   28 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
29
Marina Matešić: The Politics of Gender Asylum in the U. S. ...
REFERENCES
Abu-Lughod, L. (2002). Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Reflections on Cultural 
Relativism and Its Others, American Anthropologist, 104 (3): 783–7�0, doi: 10.1525/
aa.2002.104.3.783.
Akram, S. M. (2000). Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims, International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 12 (1): 7–40, doi: 10.10�3/ijrl/12.1.7.
Anghie, A. (2002). Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, 
Economy and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, Journal of International 
Law and Politics, 34 (3): 513–633.
Arnett, A. K. (2005). One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Women Asylum-Seekers in 
the United States and Canada Stand to Lose Human Rights under the Safe Third 
Country Agreement, Lewis & Clark Law Review, � (4): �51–�7�.
Beck, R. J. (1���). Britain and the 1�33 Refugee Convention: National or State Sovereignty, 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 11 (4): 5�7–624, doi: 10.10�3/ijrl/11.4.5�7. 
Charlesworth, H. (2003). Feminist Methods in International Law, in: N. E. Dowd and 
M. S. Jacobs (eds). Feminist Legal Theory: An Anti-Essentialist Reader. New York: New 
York University Press, 78–86.
Chisholm, B. J. (2001). Credible Definitions: A Critique of U.S. Asylum Law’s Treatment 
of Gender-Related Claims, Howard Law Journal, 44 (3): 427–441.
Freedman, J. (2007). Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Freedman, J. (2010). Protecting Women Asylum Seekers and Refugees: From 
International Norms to National Protection?, International Migration, 48 (1): 175–1�8, 
doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2435.200�.0054�.x.
Gallagher, D. (1�8�). The Evolution of International Refugee Regime, International 
Migration Review, 23 (3): 57�–5�8.
Gibney, M. J. (2004). The Ethics and Politics of Asylum: Liberal Democracy and the Response 
to Refugees. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goodwin-Gill, G. S. (2001). Refugees: Challenges to Protection, International Migration 
Review, 35 (1): 130–142.
Grewal, I. (1��8). On the New Global Feminism and the Family of Nations: Dilemmas 
of Transnational Feminist Practices, in: E. Shohat (ed.). Talking Visions: Multicultural 
Feminism in a Transnational Age. New York: New Museum of Contemporary Art, 
501–530.
Grewal, I. and Kaplan, C. (1��4). Introduction: Transnational Feminist Practices and 
Questions of Postmodernity, in: I. Grewal and C. Kaplan (eds). Scattered Hegemonies: 
Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1–36.
Gruenbaum, E. (2001). The Female Circumcision Controversy: An Anthropological Perspective. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Hathaway, J. (2000). A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of Refugee Law, in: 
B. S. Chimni (ed.). International Refugee Law: A Reader. New Delhi – Thousand Oaks – 
London: SAGE Publications.
Jaeger, G. (2001). On the History of International Protection of Refugees, International 
Review of the Red Cross, 83 (843): 727–736. 
20_Matesic.indd   29 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
Migracijske i etničke teme 30 (2014), 1: 7–32
30
Keely, C. B. (2001). International Refugee Regime(s): The End of the Cold War Matters, 
International Migration Review, 35 (1): 303–314, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-737�.2001.tb00016.x.
Kim, S. (1��3). Gender-Related Persecution: A Legal Analysis of Gender Bias in Asylum 
Law, Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, 2 (1): 107–137.
Knief, A. (2006). Gender bias in Asylum Law: Recognizing Persecution against Women 
and Girls, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domviol/
priorwinners/Knief1.authcheckdam.pdf (30 May 2013).
Lewis, L. (2005). Genital Mutilation Can Be Grounds for Asylum Status, National 
Public Radio, 11 March 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=4531744 (30 May 2013). 
Lieberman, I. (2002). Women and Girls Facing Gender-Based Violence, and Asylum 
Jurisprudence, Human Rights, 2� (3): �–10.
Mohanty, C. T. (1�88). Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses, Feminist Review, 30 (1): 61–88, doi:10.1057/fr.1�88.42.
MUP [Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia] (2006). Prvi puta u Hrvatskoj 
priznato pravo na azil, http://www.mup.hr/2579/1.aspx (30 May 2013).
Orford, A. (2003). Reading Humanitarian Intervention, Human Rights and the Use of Force in 
International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Randall, M. (2002). Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence Against Women: 
A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Recognizing Asylum Claims Based 
on Gender Persecution, Harvard Women’s Law Journal, 25: 281–318.
Richmond, A. (1��4). Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the World Order. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press.
Schenk, T. S. (1��4). Proposal to Improve the Treatment of Women in Asylum Law: 
Adding a Gender Category to the International Definition of Refugee, Indiana Journal 
of Global Legal Studies, 2 (1): 301–344.
Sinha, A. (2001). Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the Cultural 
Hook for Claims Involving Gender-Related Persecution, N.Y.U. Law Review, 76 (5): 
1562–15�8.
Spivak, G. C. (1�88). Can the Subaltern Speak, in: C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds). 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 271–313.
Stein, D. (1996). Gender Asylum Reflects Mistaken Priorities, The Human Rights Brief, 
Center for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Washington College of Law, 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/v3i3/stein33.htm (30 May 2013).
Župarić-Iljić, Drago (ed.) (2013). Prvih deset godina razvoja sustava azila u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: 
Institut za migracije i narodnosti – Centar za mirovne studije – Kuća ljudskih prava.
DOCUMENTS
UNHCR (1��6). Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
Geneva: UNHCR, Public Information Section, http://www.unhcr.org/4d944e589.pdf. 
(30 May 2013).
UNHCR (2002). Guidelines on International Protection, Gender-Related Persecution within 
the Article 1A (2) of the 1951Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/3d58ddef4.html (30 May 2013). 
20_Matesic.indd   30 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
31
Marina Matešić: The Politics of Gender Asylum in the U. S. ...
UNHCR (200�). Conclusions Adopted by the Executive Committee on the International 
Protection of Refugees. Geneva: UNHCR, http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b28bf1f2.
pdf (30 May 2013).
UNHCR (2010). Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva: 
UNHCR, Communications and Public Information Service, http://www.unhcr.
org/3b66c2aa10.html (30 May 2013).
UNHCR (2011). ExCom Members and How to Apply http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/4�c3646c8�.html (30 May 2013).
United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (1��5). Considerations for 
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women (“INS Gender Guidelines”), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b31e7.html (30 May 2013).
CASES
Fatin v. INS, 12 F. 3d 1233 Third Circuit, 1���. 
Matter of Acosta, 1� I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA, 1�85). 
Matter of Kassindja, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 361 (BIA, 1��6).
Mohammed v. Gonzales, No. 03-70803, United States Court of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit, 
March 2005. 
20_Matesic.indd   31 7/27/2014   10:07:16 AM
Migracijske i etničke teme 30 (2014), 1: 7–32
32
Politika rodnog azila u SAD-u: zaštita tražiteljica 
azila u kontekstu globalnih nejednakosti
Marina Matešić
SAŽETAK
U radu se propituju promjene u rodno osjetljivijim interpretacijama izbjegličkog 
statusa u međunarodnim i nacionalnim zakonima o azilu i politikama u kontekstu 
suvremenih te povijesnih globalnih odnosa moći. Analiziraju se i jezične promjene 
u međunarodnim UNHCR-ovim uputama za zaštitu tražiteljica azila, nacionalnim 
smjernicama SAD-a za procjenu rodno povezanih zahtjeva za azil i u nedavnim sud-
skim presudama SAD-a koje se tiču rodno povezanih zahtjeva žena. U fokusu anali-
ziranih sudskih slučajeva nalazi se slučaj Mohammed iz 2005. zbog dvojbene sudske 
odluke i pravnih interpretacija. Smatrajući da je za razumijevanje suvremenog su-
stava azila i tražiteljica azila presudno to što su zapadne zemlje instrumentalizirale 
međunarodni sustav zaštite izbjeglica, u argumentaciji se povezuje povijesne uvjete 
s načinom na koji je zaštita žena izbjeglica iz »kulturno« rodnog nasilja artikulirana 
u politici azila u SAD-u. Autoričin je općeniti zaključak da su međunarodni zakon, 
vladine organizacije i liberalne nevladine organizacije za ženska ljudska prava obli-
kovali međunarodnu i nacionalnu pravnu zaštitu (žena) tražitelja azila na način koji 
u svojem prikazu žena »Trećeg svijeta« i njihovih kultura reproducira globalne ne-
jednakosti, iskorištava tražiteljice azila koje bježe od nasilja za ostvarivanje kulturne 
superiornosti Zapada te prikriva restriktivnu i rasističku zapadnu politiku azila pre-
ma imigrantima i tražiteljima azila.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: rodno utemeljeni azil, zaštita tražitelja azila, orijentalizam, među-
narodni zakon, ženska ljudska prava
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